NRC grants design Certification to Westinghouse AP1000

This may be old news for some, but because many South African’s were on vacation between mid December and now, the news may have been missed.  With construction of AP1000 in China at full speed, this next step represents an acceleration of supply of AP1000s into the Western Hemisphere. We are now positioned to begin an exciting new phase in the deployment of our innovative AP1000 technology.

Our customers in Georgia and South Carolina can now proceed with their combined construction and operating license (COL) applications for the first AP1000 plants in the United States, for which preparations are already underway.  (See links) Together with interim approval given by the UK Regulators, momentum is building towards a positive nuclear future.

The AP1000 reactor is safe — but don’t just take Westinghouse’s word for it.

As Westinghouse works to bring clean, reliable and affordable energy to countries around the world, we fully expect to come under the scrutiny of numerous safety authorities. The communities in which our plants are running today, and those in which we hope to build tomorrow, have the right to expect our reactors to meet the very highest standards of safety.  For that reason, our engineers have always put safety at the heart of everything we do.

So we have been immensely proud — but not particularly surprised — to see our AP1000 reactor given two highly significant accolades recently by two of the world’s most rigorous and demanding regulatory bodies. In the United States the AP1000 design was awarded Final Design Certification by the country’s Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Across the Atlantic in the UK, the Office for Nuclear Regulation and the UK Environment Agency have jointly awarded Interim Generic Design Assessment approval to the plant.  These milestones are vital steps towards bringing the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor into commercial operation — delivering not just decades of clean and safe power to future generations, but also thousands of high-quality jobs during construction and operation.

Release on AP1000 Design Certification

Other Links with more information and images

http://abcnews.go.com/Business/video/new-nuclear-reactor-approved-for-us-15214440

http://www.multivu.com/mnr/53908-nrc-grants-design-certification-to-westinghouse-ap1000

http://ap1000.westinghousenuclear.com/

Official report on Fukushima identifies failures

Both government and Tepco came in for serious criticism in the 507-page interim report from the investigation committee on the crises at the Fukushima Daiichi and Daiini nuclear power plants after the 11 March earthquake and tsunami. A provisional English translation of the executive summary explained how government agencies were meant to have interacted and cases in which this broke down. It also explained some operational mistakes made by Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) during the accident sequence.

Japanese law requires the quick establishment of a local nuclear emergency headquarters in the vicinity of the affected site. For Fukushima this meant the assembly of key staff at a facility about five kilometres away, but two factors prevented this from working properly: One was the devastation of the natural disasters that took out communications links while also preventing timely travel and the provision of food and water. The other was the lack of radioactivity filters at the building, which actually made it useless for a serious emergency of the kind that developed at Fukushima Daiichi. The report noted gravely that the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) had been told in February 2009 to install proper filters at the facility but "did not take concrete steps" to do so.

Another mismatch between the management of nuclear emergencies and natural disasters emerged at the prime minister's office, where the main emergency headquarters were situated. There was insufficient communication between the nuclear and the natural disaster sides, and also NISA and the Ministry of Economics Trade and Industry (METI) did not set up adequate information flow from Tepco. Government communications to the public were accordingly delayed and ambiguous.

Tepco was criticised for two potential operating mistakes during the accident sequence. The first was misjudgement of the status of the unit 1 emergency cooling, which operators thought was working normally, but was not. By the time this was noticed and acted upon, major damage had occurred. At unit 3 a wrong decision by shift operators without advice from managers left it without cooling for over six critical hours. More broadly, Tepco had inadequate measures to cope with station blackouts, and had no plans for the seawater injection technique on which it came to rely.

An overall failing of Tepco, NISA, METI and its predecessors was to fail to plan for very large tsunamis. The site was licensed in the 1960s and 1970s on the basis of a 3.1 metre tsunami height, and although later studies indicated that 15-metre tsunami inundation was possible, no concrete steps were taken by any of the bodies to do anything about it.

Japan had established the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) for exactly the kind of nuclear emergency presented by the Fukushima accident. Although the earthquake disrupted SPEEDI's operation so that it could not give full results on radiation doses at various places near the accident site, it was still accurately predicting the path of the radioactivity. However, this excellent data was not communicated, and hence not used in planning evacuations.

Copyright © 2012 World Nuclear Association, All rights reserved

NucNet News in Brief / No. 239 / 1st December 2011

Nuclear Fuel Melted Through PCV At Fukushima-Daiichi Unit 1, Says Tepco

1 Dec (NucNet): The operator of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan has said nuclear fuel melted through the primary containment vessel (PCV) at the facility’s number one reactor unit following the accident on 11 March 2011.

Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) said analysis of the state of melted fuel in unit 1 had shown that melted fuel burned not only through the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), but also through the PCV and then through concrete in the lower part of the PCV.

According to the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum the fuel analysis was carried out by Tepco and several research institutes. The analysis was based on temperatures inside the reactors, the amounts of cooling water and other data.

Tepco said that in the “worst case”, all fuel rods in unit 1 may have melted and dropped through the bottom of the RPV into the PCV.

Tepco estimates the fuel then eroded about 65 centimetres into the 2.6-metre concrete base of the RPV in the lower section of the PCV. A government model estimated the erosion at up to two metres.

The molten core stopped short of reaching the PCV’s steel casing, under which lies an additional 7.6 metres of concrete foundation, Tepco said.

Tepco also said as much as 57 percent of the fuel in unit 2 and 63 percent of the fuel in unit 3 may have melted, and that some of the melted fuel may have dropped through the bottom of the RPVs into the PCVs.

In May 2011, Tepco said most of the fuel rods in unit 1 had melted and dropped to the bottom of the RPV within 16 hours of the earthquake and tsunami that struck the plant.

The company said that about four-and-a-half hours after the scram – the automatic emergency shutdown of the plant due to the earthquake – the level of water in the RPV fell below the top of fuel rods and fuel started to overheat.

>>Related reports in the NucNet database (available to subscribers)

Fukushima-Daiichi Fuel Rods Melted Within Hours, Says Tepco (News in Brief
No. 119, 17 May 2011)

Source:    NucNet
Editor:    david.dalton@worldnuclear.org

Media Release on NECSA Group CEO, DR Rob Adam

Media Statement issued by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa)

Date: 30 November 2011

MEDIA RELEASE ON NECSA GROUP CEO, DR ROB ADAM

The Chief Executive of the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa), Dr Rob Adam, will be leaving Necsa after being at the helm of the corporation for six productive years. He will be pursuing an opportunity in the private sector from February 2012.

During Adam’s tenure as CEO, Necsa has stabilized and has once again taken its rightful place at the forefront of nuclear technology in South Africa. Adam has driven the set of national strategic initiatives leading to the adoption of nuclear power as a fundamental component of South Africa’s future reduced carbon generation mix very effectively.

Key achievements in the Necsa Group during the past six years include:

▪ The rise of NTP Radioisotopes to become one of the world’s top radiochemicals companies.

▪ Necsa Group turnover rising from around R600 million in 2006 to a projected R1,8 billion in

2012.

▪ The establishment of a globally competitive nuclear manufacturing division at Necsa, with

ASMEIII accreditation.

▪ The construction of the Necsa Visitor Centre as South Africa’s premier public understanding of science venue.

▪ The establishment of the Nuclear Skills Development Centre and the Decentralized Trade

Test Centre at Necsa, currently training and testing hundreds of artisans annually.

▪ Significant improvements in safety and security performance at Necsa.

▪ Converting the SAFARI-1 Reactor to operate on low enriched uranium (LEU) reactor fuel and LEU target plates for the production of medical radioisotopes,

▪ Necsa consistently obtaining unqualified audit reports from the Auditor General.

▪ Securing major international commercial partnerships such as with France, the USA, Australia and Algeria.

▪ The conceptualization of sweeping new initiatives, such as a replacement reactor for SAFARI‐1 and the anti-retroviral project, which redirects Pelchem’s fluorine technology competence towards the pharmaceutical industry.

In addition, Adam has exhibited great personal leadership qualities, which have been recognized, for example, by his being elected President of the Nuclear Industries Association of South Africa (NIASA) for four consecutive years, being awarded a Lifetime Achievers Award by the South African National Energy Association (SANEA) and recently being bestowed the National Order of Merit by the Government of France, in recognition of his achievements in promoting France‐South Africa scientific cooperation .

The Necsa Board takes this opportunity to wish Dr Rob Adam well in this new phase of his career.

Dr Manne Dipico (Chairperson)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Chantal Janneker 

Group Executive: Marketing and Communication

South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa)

Tel:      +27 12 305 5750

Fax:      +27 12 305 5751

Cell:     +27 83 488 3850

E-mail: chantal.janneker@necsa.co.za

Or

Elliot Mulane

Manager: Communication & Media Liaison

South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa)

Tel:      +27 12 305 5006

Fax:      +27 12 305 5062

Cell:     +27 78 803 5569

E-mail: elliot.mulane@necsa.co.za

THE NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK News in Brief / No. 225 / 2 November 2011

Tepco Confirms Possibility Of Fission At Fukushima-Daiichi Unit 2

2 Nov (NucNet): Plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) has confirmed that it has detected signs of nuclear fission reactions in unit number 2 at the shut-down Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan.

Tepco said particles from melted fuel in unit 2 at Fukushima-Daiichi might have “temporarily triggered a criticality incident”. This means the particles were of a configuration that could have led to a self-sustaining chain reaction.

In a statement the company said it began spraying boric acid on unit2 at

02:48 Japan time today to prevent accidental chain reactions. Tepco said it may have found xenon, which is associated with nuclear fission, while examining gases taken from the reactor.

Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said there have been no drastic changes in the reactor’s temperature and pressure level, and the reactor itself is stable overall.

Saying that criticality might have occurred temporarily or partially, Tepco said one hundred thousandth of a becquerel per cubic centimetre of

xenon-133 and xenon-135 was detected in gas samples.

Xenon-133 and xenon-135 are materials created through nuclear fission.

They are not usually detected even when a reactor is in operation because fuel rods are enclosed in gas-tight zirconium metal tubes. This means fission might have occurred in the melted fuel, or corium.

Corium, also called fuel containing material (FCM) or lava-like fuel containing material (LFCM), is a molten mixture of portions of nuclear reactor core, formed during a nuclear meltdown. It comprises of uranium fuel, fuel clads, and other core-internal material.

Yoshinori Moriyama, a NISA spokesman, told NucNet there is a possibility fission started from some small pieces of melted fuel. However, the fission was probably small and partial, he said, adding, “large-scale fission was unlikely”.

http://www.worldnuclear.org/